1 The motivational rule for examining the legality of trade restrictions was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court to the City of Chicago Business Council (1918) 246 US 231: « Any restraint is essential until it regulates and only encourages competition. In order to clarify this issue, the Court must generally take into account the facts of the undertaking on which the deference is exercised, its condition before and after the limitation, the nature of the restriction and its actual or probable effect. » However, EU competition law recognises that certain agreements between competitors can have significant economic benefits, particularly when they complement activities, capabilities or assets. Such « horizontal cooperation » can be a way to share risks, reduce costs, increase investment, pool know-how, improve product quality and diversity and accelerate the introduction of innovation, and thus bring benefits to EU consumers and trade, as well as attractive economic benefits for the companies concerned (see checklist). This section provides an exception to joint ventures received by the parties when they increase the efficiency of production, supply, distribution, storage, purchase or control of goods or services. Section 3, paragraph 1, of the Act cannot be invoked independently and must necessarily be used with section 3, paragraph 3, in the context of horizontal agreements or section 3(4) in relation to vertical agreements. It should be noted, however, that paragraph 3, paragraph 1, is not only a suggestive provision, but is essentially the « gender » of the act. It should also be invoked independently to serve the interests of consumers and also cover various other types of agreements that may not fall under the auspices of Section 3, paragraph 3 or 3, paragraph 4. Agreements involving competitors will be particularly relevant from the point of view of EU and UK competition law if there is coordination on certain sensitive parameters (for example. B price and/or production) or where cooperation allows strong parties already with strong positions to acquire, maintain or increase market power (resulting in negative effects on prices, production, product quality, product diversity or innovation). This includes horizontal cooperation that also pursues legitimate objectives (unlike Section 19 (1) of the Act, the ICC plans to inquire about an alleged violation of Section 3 (1) of the Act when paying royalties and in the prescribed manner.
The ICC may also act when the central government or a state government or legal authority refers to it. The ICC only continues the investigation in cases of prima facie and then orders the Director General to open an investigation into the matter. If, as a result of an investigation, the ICC finds that the agreement is anti-competitive and has AAEC, it may take any of the following steps, with the exception of the provisional measures it can take under Article 33 of the Act: see the « horizontal guidelines »: guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements (JO L 327 of 28.12.2001, p. Horizontal agreements are restrictive agreements between competitors operating at the same level of the production and distribution chain. Horizontal agreements that, directly or indirectly, result in or are likely to have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition are in themselves violations. Section 4 of the Competition Protection Act 4054 (the « Competition Act ») prohibits them directly. Horizontal agreements for the exchange of competitively sensitive information may, depending on the circumstances, be considered horizontal anti-competitive agreements and fall under Article 4 of the Competition Act.
Trackbacks for this post